Between Inner Asia and East Asia: Tibet’s Historical Context and Pragmatic Opportunities
The Inner Asia and East Asia complex has been the traditional cornerstone of imperial undertaking in Asia. Inner Asia exported organisation and technologies, whereas East Asia provided manpower and money. Hardly is it coincidental that, during their golden eras, the Inner-and-East Asia empires — the Mongul and the Manchu, for example — relied politically on a minority of Inner Asian organisers and a majority of East Asian tribute-payers; and militarily on a minority of Inner Asian warrior nobility and a majority of East Asian auxiliary troops. Inner Asia’s organisation and technologies, failing East Asia’s manpower and money, could only preserve Inner Asia’s traditional tribal or feudal freedom, but were inadequate to establish and maintain an empire of vast territories and population (not to mention that empires always erode freedom). East Asia’s manpower and money, without sustained input and renewal of organisation and technologies from Inner Asia, inevitably became weakened, out-of-date, incapable of self-defence, let alone preserving the legacies of the founding conquerors.
The significance of Tibetan culture and religion to various Inner Asia nations and empires, can be compared with the Holy See’s influence to the West. The meeting in 1577 between Altan Khan, the Mongol ruler, and Sonam Gyatso, the 3rd Dalai Lama, analogous to the priest-patron alliance between Charlemagne and Pope Leo III, underpinned the modern Tibetan-Mongolian relationship. Sonam Gyatso found Altan Khan the patron for Gelug-pa institutions and proclaimed him to be the reincarnation of Kublai Khan; in return, Altan Khan gave the title Dalai Lama to Sonam Gyatsho. The Mongols played the role of Germanic tribal “barbarians”, using their military power to protect the religion. In more recent times, both the Russians and Manchus played similar roles.
Sitting on the throne of an Inner Asia empire, the Chinese Communist (or Leninist) regime finds itself in an awkward position: the Chinese theory of the Tibet-incorporating zhonghua minzu (the Chinese nation) originates from the Manchu (the Qing Empire) conquest of Inner-and-East Asia; yet China’s rule in Tibet derives its theoretical legitimacy from a revolution which overthrew the Manchus. Moreover, the real organisation and power, with which the Chinese had usurped the Inner-and-East Asia empire, came from the atheist Communist movement. However, only religious protectors are legitimate rulers from the perspective of the predominantly-Buddhist Tibetans.
That the Communists could have successfully taken East Asia was largely because Moscow, their backer, played the role of Inner Asia’s traditional conquerors — by providing organisation and technologies. After betraying Moscow, however, Peking had to rely increasingly on East Asia’s resources, reversing the empire’s founding order of Inner Asia ruling East Asia, and thus gradually losing the legitimacy and power to rule Inner Asia. This also explains the decline of the Mongol empire after Kublai Khan and the Manchu empire after Qianlong.
Historically, once the Inner-and-East-Asia architecture’s centre of gravity shifted from Inner Asia to East Asia, two consequences ensued: 1) Inner Asian states sought separation or autonomy — or what is known in Chinese as the “betrayal of the four barbarians” — which is the norm of regime or dynasty change in East Asia; and 2) new conquerors replaced old ones and, through invasion, established new Inner-and-East Asia empires. The replacement of the Manchu-Mongol alliance with the Communists could hardly happen without Russia becoming the heir to the Inner Asia empire.
Now, it is China’s turn to resist the same tide. The Leninist regime, because of its pretension to a nation state and market economy, becomes less effective in instilling terror than in evoking anger. Record amount of money from East Asia only buys more hostility. The Leninist regime’s military technologies, after being cut off its import channel from the West, relied on relatively backward Russia. Today, the ancient balance between Inner Asia and East Asia manifests itself as the complex relationship between Moscow and Peking.
On the surface, Moscow and Peking tacitly divide up Inner Asia between themselves: Moscow supports Peking’s rule over Tibet; Peking supports Moscow’s influence in the five Central Asian states; both serve as each other’s rear support to challenge the West. Nonetheless, the fragile geopolitics of Inner Asia inhibits any long-lasting trust and co-operation between them. Moscow might have to tolerate Western primacy because the West’s advantage is dominant in almost every sphere; yet East Asia’s new-found superiority sustained merely by money — reversing the traditional ruling order between the two regions — would be much unpalatable for Moscow. After betraying Peking over Taiwan, Moscow can play the same trick on China over Tibet. After all, Taiwan matters much less to Moscow than Tibet, which relates more directly to Russia’s interests in Inner Asia — its traditional sphere of influence.
If Russia is content to be just a European state, barely would her international stature surpass Poland — this was the situation with the Grand Duchy of Moscow (or Muscocy) before Ivan the Terrible (Ivan IV); if Russia is content to be just an Inner Asia power, scarecely would she fare any better than Turkey or Iran. That Russia is feared both by the West and the East owes to her Eurasian duality. To the West, Russia can tap into the extra resources and the vast and safe backyard offered by Inner Asia, which gives her a distinctive advantage over her European neighbours who, with enemies from all directions, lean on no others but themselves; to the East, Russia can exploit her European technological and diplomatic superiority to prevail over her Asian neighbours, who are more peripheral to the West-dominated international order. Russia cannot afford to forgo either identity to remain a great power.
Russia’s special relationship with Tibetan Buddhism, a pillar in Russia’s Inner Asia affairs, has a long history. The Tsarist Russia was the first European power that had diplomatic contact with Tibet under the 13th Dalai Lama, who leveraged Russia’s patronage to handle the Manchu court (and the Chinese mandarins) and the British Raj during the Great Game. In Tibetan tradition, Shambhala — a mythical kingdom — is widely believed to be in the Kashmir valley, which was long to be a stronghold of Buddhism. Buddhism in Kashmir suffered eclipse and later resurged, which was believed by the Buddhists to be reflecting the cycle of suffering and rebirth, and the spiritual principle that good intent and good deeds contribute to good karma and future happiness; it was also believed the future protector of Buddhism would emerge here. Agvan Dorzhiev, a close associate* of the 13th Dalai Lama, believed that the Russian empire fulfilled the Shambhala prophecy, and amongst the great powers, only Russia understood the spirituality of the Tibetan (and Asian) nation. The Tsar afforded shelter to Buddhist monks in Russia, including the Buryats (of which Agvan Dorzhiev is one), as well as to Buddhists from the Qing Empire (no less than how he protected the Christians from the Ottoman Empire).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow was keen to restore its traditional protector role of Buddhism. For Kalmykia, Tuva and various republics inhabited by Buddhists (mostly Mongolian ethnic groups) in the Russian Federation, how they view Lhasa, the Holy City, bears some resemblance to how Muslims from Tashkent or Punjab view Mecca. Although Buddhist attitude towards secular power differ somewhat from Muslims, various Russian republics and Mongolia have continued to invite and receive the 14th Dalai Lama. Disrespect towards the 14th Dalai Lama could threaten Russia’s ethnic unity and security as a Eurasian power.
Moscow’s recent belligerence in Crimea, Georgia and Syria further enhances the political standing of the Buddhists in Russia. Amid a rapidly growing Muslim population in Inner Asia, as well as the aging, if not dwindling, ethnic Russian population (over 50% identify themselves as Orthodox Christians), Russia is particularly sensitive to Peking’s “Belt and Road” strategy to cultivate relationship with Inner Asian Muslims. The friendship of Inner Asian Buddhists are precious historical assets for Moscow, and will likely become more valuable over time. Peking’s obstinacy to differentiate the 14th Dalai Lama’s religious activities from the political demands of the Tibetans in exile proves a diplomatic blunder. In comparison, the Manchus, in the empire’s early days, showed more finesse in handling Mongol and Tibetan affairs.
Should Trump’s new administration remove the obstacle for Moscow to reconcile with the West, Putin would gladly catch the olive branch. The imminent diplomatic revolution will have an impact on Inner Asia’s balance of power, including the Tibet issue. Regardless of what the Tibetans intend, given their relative insignificance in terms of hard power, they will have to cope with a new situation. To relieve their plight, Dharamsala has to be more proactive, adept and decisive than other stakeholders by capitalising on the aforementioned historical resources and diplomatic revolution.
內亞與東亞之間：西藏的歷史脈絡和現實機遇
內亞－東亞體系在傳統上是帝業的基礎，但二者的關係絕非對等。內亞輸出組織和技術，東亞提供人力和金錢。內亞－東亞帝國在其黃金時代，在政治上都依靠少量內亞組織者和大量東亞進貢者，在軍事上都依靠少量內亞貴族武士和大量東亞輔助部隊，都不是偶然的。組織和技術如果得不到人力和金錢的支持，就只能保存部落或封建的自由，不可能建立和維持廣土眾民的帝國，儘管帝國總是自由的腐蝕劑。人力和金錢如果得不到組織和技術的持續輸入和更新，就會越來越軟弱和落伍，連自衛能力都會喪失殆盡，更不用說維護征服者的遺產了。
西藏文化和宗教對內亞諸民族、諸帝國的特殊意義，恐怕只有羅馬教廷對西方世界的影響才能相提並論。蒙古可汗和西藏教宗1577年在青海湖南岸的會談酷似查理曼和利奧的會見，奠定了近代蒙藏關係的基礎。俺答汗尊格魯派上師為達賴，達賴尊可汗為轉輪王。蒙古人扮演了日耳曼蠻族的角色，以其武力保護教會。近代以來，俄羅斯人和滿洲人加入了蒙古人的行列。
北京的紅色政權坐在內亞帝國的寶座上，處境最為尷尬。中華民族包括西藏的理論依據來自滿洲人對內亞和東亞的征服，中華國族統治西藏的理論依據卻來自推翻滿洲征服者的革命。共產主義者繼承內亞體系和東亞體系的實際組織和力量來自國際共產主義，然而只有宗教保護人才能有效統治篤信佛法的藏人。
中國共產黨入主東亞大陸，關鍵因素在於莫斯科保護人扮演了歷代內亞征服者的角色。北京背叛莫斯科以後，不得不越來越多地依靠東亞的資源，逆轉了以內亞統治東亞的建國秩序，也就一步一步地喪失了統治內亞的資格和力量。忽必烈以後的蒙古帝國、乾隆以後的滿洲帝國走向衰落，根本原因都在於此。
內亞－東亞體系的重心一旦從內亞轉向東亞，就會產生兩種後果。其一是內亞各邦的分離，漢文史學著作通常稱為“四夷背叛”。內亞和東亞分離的結果就是東亞的四分五裂，四夷背叛和群雄割據都是改朝換代的例行公事。其二是新征服者取代舊征服者，通過新一輪入侵建立新的內亞－東亞帝國。共產國際取代滿蒙聯盟，離不開俄羅斯作為內亞帝國繼承人的政治素質。
今天的中華人民共和國作為帝國繼承人，正在徒勞地反抗同樣的命運。列寧黨的組織力量，由於不得不冒充民族國家和市場經濟的緣故，令人恐懼的程度有所降低，令人反感的程度卻沒有降低。東亞地區的金錢雖然有所增加，卻只能買到更多的敵意。列寧黨的軍事技術喪失了通向西方主流的輸入渠道，只能依靠相對落伍的俄羅斯人。內亞和東亞的古老天平，在今天體現為莫斯科和北京的複雜矛盾。
表面上看，莫斯科和北京瓜分了內亞海洋。莫斯科支持北京對西藏的統治，北京支持莫斯科對中亞五國的統治。莫斯科和北京相互構成對方的大後方，挑戰西方主流。實際上，內亞因素已經決定兩者不可能相互信任或長期合作。莫斯科可以容忍西方的優勢，因為西方的優勢是全方位的，但不能容忍東亞人僅僅依靠金錢的力量，顛倒自古以來的統治秩序。莫斯科在台灣問題上背叛北京，意味著她下一步就會在西藏問題上增加背叛的力量。畢竟台灣的前途和命運，對俄羅斯影響甚微，但西藏問題並非如此，直接關係到俄羅斯作為內亞帝國的存在。
俄羅斯如果僅僅做一個歐洲國家，國際地位不可能超過波蘭。事實上，伊凡四世以前的莫斯科大公國就處在這樣的境地。俄羅斯如果僅僅做一個內亞帝國，命運更不會比土耳其或伊朗好。俄羅斯之所以同時遭到東方和西方的忌憚，正是因為她的歐洲邦國／內亞帝國二元性。莫斯科面對西方的時候，憑藉內亞的額外資源和安全後方，凌駕於依靠本國和四面受敵的鄰邦之上。莫斯科面對東方的時候，憑藉歐洲的技術優勢和外交身份，凌駕於比自己更外圍的鄰邦。只要俄羅斯不願離開列強俱樂部，就不能放棄兩種身份當中的任何一種。
俄羅斯和藏傳佛教的特殊關係源遠流長，構成莫斯科經營內亞的柱石。達賴十三世跟滿洲朝廷、英印帝國交涉的時候，都以沙皇為後盾。藏文化區本來就有香巴拉傳說，可能起源於克什米爾河谷地區的歷史記憶。據說，此地原本是佛法昌盛的人間樂土。外敵入侵，佛法一度中衰，然而善因必生善果，未來的佛教保護人將會在此出現。達賴親信德爾智就相信，俄羅斯帝國應驗了香巴拉預言，列強當中，只有俄羅斯理解亞洲人的心靈。沙皇不僅保護了俄羅斯帝國境內的佛教信徒，包括德爾智出身的布里亞特蒙古人，而且積極地保護大清帝國境內的佛教徒，不亞於保護奧斯曼帝國境內的基督徒。
蘇聯解體以後，莫斯科亟欲恢復佛教保護人的傳統角色。俄羅斯聯邦境內的卡爾梅克共和國、圖瓦共和國和眾多佛教徒共和國（以及蒙古）仰望聖城拉薩，不亞於塔什乾和旁遮普的穆斯林仰望麥加。儘管佛教徒對世俗權力的看法不同於穆斯林，但俄羅斯各共和國（以及蒙古）仍然不斷邀請達賴十四世來訪。任何人只要對達賴十四世不敬，就會危及俄羅斯作為歐亞大國的統一和安全。
普京政府在高加索和中東的戰爭，進一步增加了俄羅斯佛教徒的政治重要性。內亞穆斯林人口迅速增長，俄羅斯東正教徒人口迅速萎縮。北京借助一帶一路培植穆斯林代理人的佈局，尤其觸動了俄羅斯最敏感的神經。內亞佛教徒的友誼對莫斯科而言，是極其寶貴的歷史資源，而且隨著時間的推移，重要性還將不斷增加。北京拒絕區分達賴十四世的宗教活動和流亡藏人的政治訴求，實際上是外交拙劣的證明。滿洲朝廷早期處理蒙藏問題，比他們靈活得多。
川普政府消除了莫斯科和西方和解的障礙，普京明顯已經決定抓住機會。外交革命迫在眉睫，勢必衝擊包括西藏在內的整個內亞格局。藏人無論主觀意願如何，早晚必須應對新的格局，如果比其他利益相關者判斷更準確，行動更及時，就能巧妙地結合歷史資源和外交革命，有效地改善自己的地位。
