Trump’s Opportunity to Stabilise Asia-Pacific | 川普政府穩定亞太秩序的機遇
Orders stem from certainty, and wars from miscalculation; strategic ambiguity is therefore not the best policy. Maintaining the status quo at any point in history is most impractical. US strategic ambiguity has given Peking the illusional expectation that, after sacrificing enough or becoming more powerful, Peking can obtain what she desires. When Peking realises that she is so increasingly remote from her objective that she is ever unlikely to recover her costs, risking her opportunity before the window shuts becomes a more realistic option.
America can never expect Peking’s goodwill and sympathy due to fundamental difference in worldview. Even if Taiwan, like Hong Kong, falls into Peking’s hand, Peking will continue to suspect Washington’s intention to split China with US values.
The only diplomatic achievement America can expect, to the greatest extent possible, is to lessen China’s illusionary expectation. The policy of “One China, Different Interpretation”, however, happens to be fertile ground for illusions: Peking’s specifically-directed armed race is the consequence of US strategic ambiguity.
Peking’s claim to sovereignty over Mongolia — be it for ideological, pragmatic, historical or military reasons — are no less legitimate than her claim over Taiwan. But because Mongolia’s legal status is clear, Peking has not made any claim over the Siberian border. If Trump’s administration can make a prompt decision to recognise Taiwan’s normal statehood and restore her seat in the UN, Peking will have far less power and opportunity to oppose this new order than she had with Russia’s recognition of Mongolia.
In fact, strategic ambiguity tends to offer excuses for inaction: in the short term, it unjustly undermines Taiwan — a US ally of both values and interests; and in the long term, it leads China to self-destruction, ultimately increasing US’ costs to maintain order in Asia-Pacific. Ambiguity makes China unable to abandon the hope of annexing Taiwan. Meanwhile, China knows it full well that, under US dominance, she has little hope of annexing Taiwan. So it only encourages China to accumulate more military and economic power to establish a parallel system against the current Asia-Pacific order underwritter by America. This is draining and will ultimately deplete China’s resources and chances to integrate into the US-maintained international order, causing China’s destruction and chaos in Asia.
The further one goes into the wrong direction, the higher the price s/he will have to pay. A decisive US can help release China and Taiwan from this predicament.
China has no legitimate reason to oppose Taiwan’s statehood. She has adopted the same policy towards North Korea and South Korea. Peking, an apostle of Machiavellian realpolitik, knows that she has, though being a loser of the Cold War, already reaped unexpected reward of being treated like a Cold War winer and world power. More importantly, she understands — better than anyone else — that she has little power to oppose the US: this, for a tyrannical regime, is the most convincing language she understands.
The reason that Moscow, although much less powerful than Washington, gains more respect in Peking is that Moscow is proficient at realpolitik, which reduces room for misjudgement. By contrast, the Obama administration has been reluctant to use its immense power, and forgets that Peking, like Osama Bin Laden, holds the weak in contempt.
That Obama was snubbed in Hangzhou was precisely because he was inept in using languages Peking understands. If Trump’s presidency can avoid the same mistake, he might be able to establish long-term peace in Asia-Pacific with a fait accompli.
秩序來自確定性，戰爭來自各方的誤判。因此，戰略模糊不是最好的政策。
維持現狀在歷史上任何時期，都是最不可能穩定的邊界。
模糊戰略給北京提供了太多的幻想，使他們期望在付出足夠的代價以後，或是自己更加強大以後，就能如願以償。他們發現自己離目的越來越遠時，已經無法收回為此付出的成本了，在機會窗口關閉以前鋌而走險，自然越來越可能變成現實的選擇。
雙方在認知結構方面的差異不可能彌合，因此美國無論如何都不可能指望北京的善意理解。即使台灣像香港一樣落入北京手中，北京仍然會繼續猜疑華盛頓利用價值觀分裂中國。
美國唯一能夠指望的外交成就，無非就是盡可能消除北京的僥倖心理。一個中國、各自解讀的政策，恰好是僥倖心理的沃土。北京針對性極強的軍備競賽，正是模糊戰略結出的惡果。
北京在意識形態、現實政治、歷史沿革、軍事需要方面索取蒙古的理由，絕不低於台灣。同樣的惡果沒有出現在西伯利亞邊界，正是因為蒙古的法律地位非常明確。川普政府如果當機立斷，恢復台灣的正常國家地位和聯合國席位，北京反對新秩序的能力和機會，遠遠低於他們為蒙古反對俄羅斯的能力和機會。
模糊戰略實際上會變成因循苟且的遮羞布，在短期內不公正地傷害價值和利益的盟友台灣，從長期看將中國推向自我毀滅的絕路，最終使美國維持亞太秩序的成本大大上升。
模糊空間使中國無法放棄最終吞併台灣的希望，同時又能看清在美國霸權的主導下，不可能真正吞併台灣，因此必然寄希望於整軍經武，建立對抗美國秩序的平行體系。這樣的企圖正在而且終將耗盡中國的資源和融入世界的機會，導致中國的毀滅和亞洲的動亂。
你在錯誤的道路上走得越遠，付出的代價就會越高。美國當機立斷，對台灣和中國都意味著解脫。
中國完全清楚，它沒有正當理由反對中國和台灣的平等地位。它自己對待朝鮮和韓國，就採取了同樣的政策。北京是現實政治和馬基雅維利主義的冷酷信徒，非常清楚自己身為冷戰的失敗者，如果能夠享受冷戰勝利者和世界主宰者的同等待遇，已經是獲得了意外的收穫。同時而且更加重要的是，它比誰都清楚自己沒有反抗的能力。對於僭主政權而言，這個理由比其他所有理由都更有說服力。
莫斯科的實力雖然遠遠不如華盛頓，卻在北京獲得了更多的尊重，正是因為俄羅斯更擅長運用現實政治的理由，大大減少了誤判的可能。相反，奧巴馬政府不肯運用自己的巨大實力，忘記了北京像本拉登一樣，對弱馬最為鄙視。
奧巴馬在杭州遭到與其身份不符的侮辱，正是因為他不擅長運用北京能夠理解的語言。川普政府只要避免同樣的錯誤，不難用既成事實奠定亞太長期和平的基礎。
